Interview. Plamen Dimitrov: Elections in Central and Southeastern Europe and the New Geopolitical Tension in the Middle East

Plamen Dimitrov, political scientist, head of the Geopolitical Bulgarian Community

Vitalii Barvinenko, Director of the Institute of Danube Research:
Dear friends, greetings. Today on the Institute of Danube Research broadcast we are joined by Mr. Plamen Dimitrov, a representative of the Bulgarian geopolitical community, an expert and political analyst from Bulgaria. We will discuss elections in Europe and the developments shaping a new international reality. Welcome, and thank you for finding the time to join us.

Plamen Dimitrov:
Hello. Thank you for the invitation.

On the elections in Hungary and Viktor Orbán’s chances

Vitalii Barvinenko:
Let us begin chronologically. Parliamentary elections will take place in Hungary on April 12. They are rather controversial, especially from the perspective of Ukraine, and they are being watched with considerable attention by Europeans, Russians, and Americans alike. For the first time, President Trump publicly intervened by appearing via video link at a Fidesz party event and calling on voters to support Viktor Orbán. What trends do you currently see in Hungary? How realistic is an Orbán victory, especially given the specifics of Hungarian electoral legislation, including the large number of single-member districts?

Plamen Dimitrov:
According to sociological surveys, perhaps for the first time in the years of Viktor Orbán’s rule, the opposition now has a real chance of winning the elections. At least, that is what the polling suggests. One reason may be that Orbán is now being challenged by an opposition leader who, until recently, was himself part of the ruling establishment in Hungary.

At this point, the struggle is no longer unfolding along the classic line of left versus right, nor even primarily along geopolitical lines. Rather, it is taking shape around the issue of corruption and the fight against corruption. Over the many years of Orbán’s rule, a very particular model of governance has emerged in Hungary. I would not describe it as outright authoritarian, but rather as a clientelist and corruption-based system. Although Orbán presents himself as a conservative, ideology does not in fact play the decisive role here. What matters instead are the clientelist structures that sustain his power.

It may be that the time has now come for this governing model to change, because Hungary is, after all, a democratic country in the center of Europe. In principle, it would be entirely normal for the opposition to win. However, as you rightly noted, there are various electoral techniques that may enable the ruling party to retain power.

I doubt that they will resort to outright falsification of the results, but I do expect them to make full use of political technologies and institutional advantages. The contest will be very serious. Although the polls currently show an advantage for the opposition, I would say that the chances of Orbán and the opposition are roughly equal. There is also the issue of the transfer of power if the opposition does win. That process would not be easy, because Orbán has built a deeply entrenched system of defense, so to speak. He is not inclined to surrender his positions quickly. Given the intensity of the election campaign, I would not rule out the possibility that, if he loses power, he could become the subject of criminal cases or investigations. So he has much to lose. That is why I cannot say with certainty who the next prime minister of Hungary will be.

On Donald Trump’s role in the Hungarian campaign

Vitalii Barvinenko:
I was looking at several studies published last week, including polling by institutes close to Fidesz and also by structures close to the Tisza Party. While they show different electoral figures, they point to roughly the same thing: President Trump’s popularity in Hungary has dropped sharply. Why did Orbán, understanding this dissonance, decide to bring Trump into his campaign as a public advocate? What do you think the technological logic behind that move is?

Plamen Dimitrov:
Well, you know, Trump is the kind of person to whom it is difficult to say no if he wants to help. Perhaps there is an element of that.

But speaking seriously, whom else could Orbán invite? He cannot invite the President of the European Commission, or Ukraine, or various European leaders. It is clear that geopolitically he is oriented toward Trump, and to some extent toward Russia as well. Of course, Russia is not something he can place front and center, so he considers it useful to secure Trump’s support and underscore that connection.

Still, it seems to me that Orbán is primarily playing on negative sentiments toward Ukraine rather than on Hungarian sympathies toward Trump or the United States. If you look at the billboards his campaign uses, you more often see Ukrainian President Zelenskyy than Trump, Vance, or anyone else. Negative campaigning is generally more effective than positive campaigning.

Will the Iranian crisis affect elections in Europe?

Vitalii Barvinenko:
In your opinion, to what extent will the situation around Iran—the Iranian crisis, the war, the oil factor—affect elections in various European countries? Will this major international development have any reflection in domestic electoral politics within the EU?

Plamen Dimitrov:
For now, I think it is too early to say. Elections will soon be held in Bulgaria and Hungary, and as for these immediate cases, I do not think the conflict around Iran will have a decisive electoral impact. Of course, the war affects the economy, but it is difficult to translate that geopolitical and geoeconomic storyline directly into domestic political struggle.

For example, what can a specific political party in Bulgaria do to influence the conflict between the United States and Iran? In reality, nothing. At most, parties can compete over which measures they would propose to soften rising prices, but that has little to do with high geopolitics or the conduct of the war in Iran itself. So I would say that, most likely, this factor will not seriously influence the upcoming elections in Europe.

Bulgaria: the start of the campaign and the Radev phenomenon

Vitalii Barvinenko:
Now let us turn to Bulgaria. Elections there will take place on April 19. We discussed previously that former President Rumen Radev would likely create his own political force. Rumors circulated for a long time about a possible “March 3” party or bloc, but eventually he settled on Progressive Bulgaria. I was in Sofia during the event at which the relevant force presented itself, and then I traveled around the country and formed my own impressions. We now have a full week of the official campaign. How do you assess the start? What new ideas or notable emphases do you see among the new participants in the campaign?

Plamen Dimitrov:
First of all, what you saw was not actually a party congress, because the party itself still does not formally exist. It was rather an official presentation of its election program.

For a long time—perhaps one or two months—former President Radev said nothing concrete about the content of his political program. When journalists asked, he always answered: “There will be a program; you will read it and then you will know.” In the end, they did publish the program.

Naturally, no voter reads lengthy political programs in detail. But the impression it creates is that it is neither left-wing nor right-wing. It is neither pro-Russian nor anti-Russian. There is really only one red thread running through it: the fight against corruption. But tell me, what political party in Europe does not include anti-corruption language in its program? Nearly all of them do. So the program is maximally cautious.

Radev is clearly trying not to alienate any group of voters. Yet some disappointment has emerged among those groups that traditionally supported him—particularly left-wing voters and those with pro-Russian sympathies. They say: “We have always supported Rumen Radev, but now he remains silent on these issues.” He does not support Russia, and he does not propose abolishing Bulgaria’s flat income tax of 10%, which applies equally to the poor and the rich.

More than that, some observers say that the economic people around Radev who wrote the program are, in fact, more right-wing than left-wing. They stated clearly that they will not change taxes and that everything will remain as it is. The only novelty they proposed is that some form of artificial intelligence should analyze public procurement and tenders conducted between companies and the state. That also looks rather strange. Then another person appeared and said: “They copied that idea from me—I proposed the same thing on Facebook a year ago.”

So the program does not particularly inspire. The second notable element is the people who will head Radev’s parliamentary candidate lists. Here it must be said that he is following a line of avoiding old faces from the old parties. One rarely sees former politicians from other parties high on his lists. Instead, what stands out is the presence of many athletes at the top—champions in volleyball and other sports. There are also former military officers. In many cities, local people have been placed first on the lists, which suggests that Radev does have some local support in the regions and decided to rely on these local figures.

Of course, Radev himself heads two candidate lists and evidently intends to become a member of parliament, because there had previously been doubts about that. The campaign itself proceeds in the same spirit: everywhere, Radev’s people criticize corruption, the existing system, and the model of governance that has prevailed until now. In that sense, this is a typical populist anti-corruption party. Polls show that support for Radev has declined slightly, but he still clearly ranks first and most likely will remain in first place until election day.

So once again, I may be repeating what I said before, but the winner of the election in Bulgaria is already fairly clear. What remains unclear is what will happen after the election, because it will be difficult for the former president to build a governing coalition.

The prospects of the Socialists, “Revival,” and the pro-Russian electorate

Vitalii Barvinenko:
You have just made a very interesting point: the program is extremely cautious. I looked at it myself, and there is virtually no mention of foreign policy at all, which is surprising for a former president. Yet his advisers presumably recommended this approach. In that context, are the chances of the Socialists, or of Kostadinov’s party “Revival,” increasing given that Radev has become more cautious?

Plamen Dimitrov:
As for the Socialists, their chances are fifty-fifty. Almost all recent polls place them at exactly 4%, which is the parliamentary threshold. So it remains uncertain whether they will enter parliament.

If we speak about Mr. Kostadin Kostadinov, the leader of the pro-Russian party “Revival,” then immediately after Radev appeared on the political scene, Kostadinov’s chances began to decline quickly, because half or even more than half of Kostadinov’s voters were ready to support Radev. But now that the program has appeared, and Radev has not said a single word in support of Russia, some of the people who had initially seen him as a new pro-Russian leader became disappointed and returned to “Revival.” As a result, the party is now polling at some respectable numbers—around 7%. It will certainly be in the next parliament.

So there is indeed such a trend: pro-Russian forces are consolidating around “Revival.” It will definitely be in parliament.

On Delyan Peevski and the limits of his influence

Vitalii Barvinenko:
What about the prospects of Delyan Peevski, the main oligarchic figure in Bulgaria? Is there any chance that he could end up following the path of oligarchs such as Plahotniuc in Moldova or Kolomoisky in Ukraine—that is, exchanging a seat in parliament for a prison cell?

Plamen Dimitrov:
No. First, I do not think he ever acquired the level of influence that Plahotniuc had in Moldova. Second, at present I see no real chance that he could end up in prison, because his hidden, behind-the-scenes influence remains very strong. He controls the prosecution service and a large portion of the judiciary.

So no, I do not think he will end up in prison. But under a new political configuration, his chances of influencing the next government are indeed decreasing. Most likely, he will remain in opposition. He probably retains his stable 10–12% of the vote, but the overall configuration has changed.

The emergence of former President Radev has altered everything. Since it is impossible for Radev to form either an open or tacit coalition with Peevski, the latter will most likely remain in opposition. Another point is that, as you know, Peevski has been sanctioned by the United States under the Magnitsky Act, and he has been trying in every possible way to create a positive impression on the Trump administration in the hope of being removed from that list. But of course, that is not working.

So Peevski will remain a factor, but no longer such a decisive one. When Radev speaks throughout the campaign—whether in Silistra, Varna, or elsewhere—about enormous corruption and presents himself as a fighter against it, then logically corruption must have at least a name, a surname, or a structure. Corruption cannot simply be an abstract thing. But the problem is that Peevski has never been a minister or the head of companies entering into direct relations with the state. He acts behind the scenes, and therefore it will be difficult to bring direct charges against him.

The chances of the liberal camp

Vitalii Barvinenko:
What about the liberals—namely “We Continue the Change” and “Democratic Bulgaria”? What are their chances?

Plamen Dimitrov:
Most likely, they will come third in the election, but their percentage is modest: recent polls give them around 11–12%. For them, perhaps the most important question is what will happen after the election. Their key issue is Radev’s behavior: will he invite them into a coalition or not?

Despite their modest support, they still have a chance to enter government. If Radev concludes that it would be politically inconvenient to form a coalition with Boyko Borissov’s GERB, and impossible to align with Peevski, then what remains? These forces—“We Continue the Change” and “Democratic Bulgaria”—remain the most plausible coalition partners.

Although during the campaign they attack each other, which is normal, and mutual accusations can be seen in television studios, they still have a chance to participate in government.

The Middle East: are we facing a long-term regional split?

Vitalii Barvinenko:
Yesterday, Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın stated that the war between Israel, the United States, and Iran is not limited to military objectives, but opens the way to a regional split with deeper and longer-term consequences—between Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and Persians. How far do you agree with that assessment? Is what is happening in Iran today not simply a fight over oil or over the destruction of the ayatollah regime, but in fact an attempt to create a strategic conflict that could last for decades?

Plamen Dimitrov:
I think he most likely had in mind the actions of Israel, a country increasingly viewed by Turkey as an adversary. Of course, Israel’s goal is to weaken Iran as much as possible. In pursuit of that goal, it may act not only against Iran itself, but also across the wider region. We see the Israeli army bombing southern Lebanon against Hezbollah, and there are also actions against pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, Syria, and probably Yemen as well. So from Israel’s perspective, weakening Iran means acting throughout the entire Middle East.

Turkey, naturally, is also affected by these processes. More broadly, a process of geopolitical reconfiguration is taking place in the region. I would say that a kind of triangle has emerged in the Middle East: Shiite Iran, the Sunni Arab states, and Turkey on one side of the equation, while Israel and the United States stand together on another side.

At this moment, Iran is suffering the most, because its military capabilities are inferior to those of the United States and Israel. But the Arab Gulf countries are also suffering, because it has become clear that the prosperity they managed to build over the last twenty or thirty years is extremely fragile and highly sensitive to security shocks.

If we look specifically at Turkey’s greatest fear—the emergence of a Kurdish state—then I believe the chances of that are low. Most likely, that scenario will not materialize.

Is regime change in Iran realistic?

Vitalii Barvinenko:
In your view, how long will the hot phase of the conflict last? And is it realistic today to change the regime in Iran?

Plamen Dimitrov:
On the second question, I think that is not realistic for now. I cannot imagine what the United States and Israel could do to bring about regime change. Yes, they have killed many leaders, but new leaders appear; those new leaders may also be killed, and yet still others emerge. This indicates that the regime is not structured like a simple pyramid, but rather as a multilayered system. That is why I think regime change is unrealistic.

The only way that might make it possible would be a large-scale ground offensive by the United States and Israel, but such a scenario is, of course, not going to happen. So most likely the regime will remain. But the war will continue.

The very fact that the United States is moving Marines toward Iran’s borders suggests that there will most likely be a new phase of escalation and perhaps some limited ground actions on Iranian territory. Personally, I think those actions could be aimed at establishing control over islands in the Persian Gulf—Kharg Island, for example, which is crucial for Iranian oil exports—and, perhaps even more importantly, over islands in the Strait of Hormuz itself, from which the security of maritime passage through the strait largely depends.

So it is difficult to say whether the war will still continue in five or six months, but in the next one or two months it will certainly continue.

Is a new Islamic defense bloc emerging?

Vitalii Barvinenko:
One final question. About ten days ago, there was a ministerial-level meeting in Riyadh involving Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Today, a similar meeting of the same four countries is taking place in Islamabad. Can we speak of the formation of some new Islamic defense bloc—one that might be directed both against Iran and against the United States and Israel?

Plamen Dimitrov:
No, such a bloc cannot be directed against the United States. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan remain allies of the United States. Turkey, too, remains a U.S. ally as a member of NATO.

But if we are talking about a bloc directed against Israel, then yes, that is possible in the sense of an anti-Israeli orientation. The Saudi Arabia–Pakistan alliance has existed for a long time, as we know. And now Turkey, which also aspires to the role of a regional power and is directly affected by events because it borders Iran, naturally seeks to coordinate its foreign policy with these countries. That said, I would not say that a formal military alliance will emerge. Rather, in this situation they simply need to coordinate their policies.

From another angle, however, the picture is more complex. Who is Iran striking now? It is striking Israel, yes, but at the same time it threatens Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and others. So, paradoxically, from that perspective Saudi Arabia and Israel find themselves in the same boat. Both are interested in weakening Iran quickly. Therefore, the situation is by no means straightforward.

Vitalii Barvinenko:
Then let me ask a follow-up. If this bloc is directed against Israel, could that mean that at some point the objectives of the United States and Israel in the Gulf region will begin to diverge?

Plamen Dimitrov:
Yes, that is a major question. In principle, I believe U.S. and Israeli interests in that region do not fully coincide. They overlap in part, but not entirely. Israel simply waited for the moment when the White House was occupied by a president who is unequivocally pro-Israeli, even more so than his predecessors. In that context, Israel has managed to achieve its long-standing goal of involving the United States in a war against Iran.

At the same time, there are differences between them. The key issue is who will exert greater influence on President Trump, so that these differences manifest themselves in practice. Israel is clearly interested in prolonging the war as much as possible so that its air force can deliver more strikes against targets in Iran. The situation for the United States is different. President Trump has repeatedly promised to be a president of peace, and he now needs the war to end as quickly as possible. In addition, oil and fuel prices in the United States are rising, and this also affects Trump politically, prompting him to work toward ending the war sooner rather than later.

So yes, I think there is a clear difference between the interests of Israel and those of the United States. For Israel, of course, oil prices matter too, but not to the same extent. Its strategic objective of weakening Iran is far more important than the price of oil.

Vitalii Barvinenko:
Thank you very much.

Plamen Dimitrov:
Thank you as well.

Vitalii Barvinenko:
Dear friends, today my guest was a representative of the Bulgarian geopolitical community, expert and political analyst Mr. Plamen Dimitrov. We discussed elections in Europe and the challenges emerging in the Middle East. Thank you for your attention.