Interview. Ian Lisnevskyi: Moldova Between European Integration, Domestic Crisis and Transnistria.

Ian Lisnevscki, Moldovan expert, political analyst and political strategist

Vitaliy Barvinenko:

Mr. Lisnevski, thank you for finding the time to join our broadcast. We have not seen each other for quite some time, and many developments have taken place that are important to discuss — both for a better understanding of the situation in Moldova and for assessing broader processes in our shared subregion.

Let us begin with European integration. President Maia Sandu recently spoke in Strasbourg. In her address, the topic of Ukraine was not mentioned when she discussed the need to open negotiation clusters for Moldova’s accession to the European Union. She emphasized that Moldova is ready, that Romania supports this process, and that in 2023 there was a common decision on the path toward the EU.

How do you assess this? Was it simply a rhetorical omission, or does it signal that Moldova may be considering a separate and faster path to the EU — without Ukraine?

Ian Lisnevski:

We can only speculate, because the real reason why Maia Sandu did not mention Ukraine in that speech is known only to her. In my view, it was most likely an omission rather than a deliberate change in strategic rhetoric.

The European integration process has become extremely complex for both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. For Moldova, acceleration toward the EU is difficult not only for geopolitical reasons, but primarily because of the country’s domestic condition.

On the international stage, Moldova has indeed achieved some progress. There are active contacts, visits, meetings, and support from partners. In terms of foreign-policy openness and international positioning, the country has shown positive dynamics. However, when we move to issues of demography, the economy, social crisis, energy vulnerability, judicial reform, anti-corruption policy, and administrative-territorial reform, the situation becomes much more complicated.

Moldova is not keeping pace with the full set of obligations required for real accession to the European Union. The Transnistrian issue remains unresolved, and recently the Gagauzia issue has also become more visible. Therefore, European integration — or even discussions about closer alignment with Romania — has become much more complicated than it appears in political rhetoric.

The problem is that Moldova has long emphasized geopolitics, international relations and external support, while pushing its own internal socio-economic problems into the background. Migration, population ageing, and the outflow of the active part of society directly affect the state’s capacity to implement reforms.

One could put it this way: European integration is desired by external partners, by part of society, and by the state itself. But the state wants it and yet cannot fully implement it.

As for Moldova’s separate accession to the EU without Ukraine, I believe that would be a major mistake. If Moldova had solved all its internal problems and were fully prepared for accession, then we could have a different discussion. But under current conditions, a separate track would create an additional political conflict between Moldova and Ukraine.

Moreover, the Transnistrian issue cannot be resolved without Ukraine’s participation. The “5+2” format is effectively not functioning, but without the involvement of neighbouring countries and stakeholders that directly influence the situation, no real settlement is possible.

Therefore, in my opinion, a separate model of Moldova’s movement toward the EU without Ukraine may be discussed theoretically, but its practical effectiveness would be minimal. It would merely create diplomatic tension. Ukraine is currently fighting and sees itself as a state defending not only its own right to a European future, but also Europe’s security. In such a situation, Moldova moving ahead separately could be perceived very painfully.

Vitaliy Barvinenko:

If we try to model the situation: suppose Moldova joins the European Union — either together with Ukraine or without Ukraine. What would Moldovan politicians then be able to offer society? After all, European integration has been the main political slogan for many years.

Ian Lisnevski:

This is precisely where the problem begins. I take a rather critical view of this issue because, unfortunately, European integration in Moldova is often not so much a state policy as a political slogan.

European integration should be a foreign-policy course of the state. But foreign policy is always a continuation of domestic policy. This is a basic principle of political science. In order to integrate into the European Union or build full-fledged partnerships with any state, one must have strong domestic policy. Moldova effectively lacks this.

The political crisis has continued since 2019–2020 and has never really stopped. Trust in political institutions is extremely low. Even if the European Union were to say, “Yes, let us move faster,” the question would arise: who inside the country would implement these reforms? The presidency, the government, the ministries, the parliament? Public trust in them is minimal.

Under such conditions, any initiatives coming from state institutions will be rejected by a significant part of society. People are already living under difficult social conditions; a large share of the population lives in poverty or on the edge of poverty. This generates a reverse effect: citizens gradually stop believing in a European future as a real prospect rather than a political promise.

Moldovan political parties have long adapted to voters’ fears and expectations. Some politicians play on pro-European emotions, while others exploit anti-European or pro-Russian sentiments. But if we look at the documents, we may find that political forces publicly declaring friendship with Russia sometimes adopted more documents on rapprochement with NATO or the EU than those who call themselves pro-European.

In other words, this is not about clear ideology, but about political technology. Moldova has used the same electoral framework for decades: East versus West, Russia versus Europe, fear versus hope. This did not start yesterday. This logic has been functioning since the 1990s.

If Moldova ever joins the EU, it will become difficult for current politicians to offer anything new. Pro-European forces will no longer be able to sell society the promise of European integration. Anti-European forces will no longer be able to mobilize voters solely with the slogan “we are against Europe.” Therefore, I do not see a realistic scenario in which Moldova becomes a full or even partial member of the EU in the next ten years. The main reason is not external, but internal: the degradation of the political class and the weakness of public administration.

Vitaliy Barvinenko:

Let us turn to domestic politics. Municipal elections were held in two Moldovan towns. In both cases, there will be a second round. How indicative are these elections? Are they local specificities of Taraclia and Orhei, or do they point to broader political processes in Moldova?

Ian Lisnevski:

These elections were interesting precisely because, in my view, different political models were being tested there — models that may later be used in the next local elections.

In Taraclia, the campaign was rather passive. The candidates behaved cautiously, avoided sharp statements and did not demonstrate excessive confrontation. Nothing unexpected happened there. According to our research, even two weeks before the elections it was clear that there would be a second round, and that it would most likely involve an independent candidate and a candidate from the Party of Socialists. Voter turnout was expected to be low — and that is exactly what happened.

The situation in Orhei was much more interesting. We conducted several analytical studies there and modelled different scenarios. If no candidate had been removed from the election, one set of candidates could have entered the second round. But once removals began, the situation changed sharply.

Orhei district has its own political specificity. In presidential and parliamentary elections, it has often voted for the party in power, demonstrating loyalty to the centre. But in local elections, forces linked to the Shor Party or structures close to it could win. This is a Moldovan paradox: at the national level, voters may behave in one way, while at the local level they may vote quite differently, because other interests, other mechanisms of influence, and another logic of mobilization are at work.

When the authorities or electoral bodies remove a candidate, society very quickly interprets this as injustice. Even when formal arguments exist, people perceive such a decision as political interference. As a result, trust in the government-backed candidate can collapse almost instantly.

In Moldova, it is generally difficult to speak of a “pure” party biography. Many politicians have at different times been connected with various political forces — the communists, democrats, liberal democrats, the Shor Party or other structures. There are not many active political cadres in the country, and a significant share of politicians have moved from one party to another.

Therefore, if past affiliation with another party is taken as a basis for removing a candidate, then almost everyone would have to be removed. A significant part of the current authorities also has a political past in other party structures. If a person is a professional and has not been involved in criminal activity, past party affiliation cannot automatically serve as grounds for political disqualification.

The problem is that such decisions only deepen distrust toward the Central Electoral Commission and other institutions. For elections to be legitimate, society must trust the electoral process. But if trust in state institutions remains at 10–20 percent, any administrative interference only intensifies the crisis.

International observers may recognize elections as formally correct. But that is not enough. The key question is whether Moldovan society itself recognizes these elections. The main threat to democracy is the growth of distrust in political processes. Moldova has not yet found an answer to this problem.

 

Vitaliy Barvinenko:

Another important issue is administrative-territorial reform. This is a systemic matter that affects the very nature of the state and its institutional architecture. Moldova plans to reduce the number of districts, create ten large regional centres, and consolidate communities.

Ukraine has already gone through a similar process. On the one hand, it is possible to mathematically justify that small mayoralties are too expensive to maintain. On the other hand, there is the issue of accessibility of services for people. Could such a reform lead to the actual decline of small villages and the concentration of life in only a few dozen centres?

Ian Lisnevski:

The issue of administrative-territorial reform in Moldova has been on the agenda for a long time — more than ten years. But in my opinion, no one has approached it seriously from the perspective of the state model. There has been no deep answer to the question: what kind of Moldova should be built, how should administrative centres, districts, communities and autonomies function, and what should be the balance between the centre and the regions?

The problem goes back to the 1990s. When Gagauz autonomy was created, it was also considered a possible model for resolving the Transnistrian issue. It was assumed that over time Transnistria could be offered a similar formula of existence within a single state. But this issue was never brought to completion.

As a result, Moldova still does not have a complete model of the state it wants to build. Should it be a unitary state with elements of autonomy? A federal model? A confederal model? Some other form? Because of historical circumstances, the very idea of federalization in Moldova is often associated with Russian influence, although similar ideas in different forms had been discussed earlier and not only by Russia.

At present, in my view, the new wave of administrative reform is largely connected with requirements or expectations coming from Brussels. There is a need to demonstrate movement: administrative reform, settlement of the Transnistrian issue, modernization of public administration. But instead of a deep reform, we see a rapidly prepared imitation structure.

Indeed, there is a rational element in the reform. Many mayoralties lack sufficient personnel to perform basic functions. They find it difficult to provide water supply, roads, lighting, local services and, partly, healthcare, security and social support. Part of local budgets is spent on maintaining the administrative apparatus rather than on development.

However, the problem is that reform cannot be purely mathematical. One cannot simply say: if a mayoralty has fewer than three thousand residents, it must be merged. The main question must be asked: why do we have so many small communities? The answer lies in demography, migration, population ageing, the economic weakness of rural areas, and the decline of the agricultural sector.

If the reform is carried out without addressing these fundamental problems, it will have to be revised again in a year or two. Today a village may have three thousand residents; in a year it may have two and a half thousand; in a few years even fewer. If today half the population is over 50, then in a few years a large share will already be in the 60-plus age group. The working-age population will disappear.

Closing mayoralties and transferring administrative centres will only accelerate youth migration. People will move closer to hospitals, schools, police and administrative services. A village without a school, without a medical point, without a road, and without the administrative presence of the state effectively loses its prospects.

On paper, one can say that enlarged mayoralties will attract investment, grants and international programmes. But in reality, given the current level of corruption and institutional weakness, these resources often do not reach specific communities. And if they do, this often happens within the logic of electoral campaigns.

The greatest problem of the current authorities is the absence of long-term planning. The government reacts to a crisis but does not analyse its fundamental cause. This applies not only to administrative reform, but also to education, healthcare, demography and social policy.

Modern public administration must use scenario modelling. There are tools that allow the consequences of reforms to be calculated several years ahead: what will happen to the population, services, budgets, migration and infrastructure. Such approaches are used by European countries, and Ukraine also has institutions working with scenario modelling. In Moldova, however, the authorities often try simply to copy someone else’s model without adapting it to domestic realities.

Therefore, I believe that this reform in its current form may create new crises instead of resolving old ones.

Vitaliy Barvinenko:

Another important issue is the decree of the Russian president on simplified issuance of Russian passports to residents of Transnistria. In Ukraine, this is being actively discussed as a potential factor of destabilization. How dangerous is it for Moldova itself?

Ian Lisnevski:

In the Moldovan media, this is indeed presented as a certain threat or a possible risk of escalation. But in my view, there is currently no direct escalation in reality.

If Russia were to say at some point that it wants to “protect its citizens” in Transnistria, similar arguments could be made by other states. Many residents of Transnistria hold more than one passport. Some have Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan, Romanian and sometimes even Bulgarian documents. Therefore, the logic of “protecting citizens” is not a one-sided instrument available only to Russia.

Romania could also say that a significant share of Transnistrian residents hold European passports. In a certain sense, if we look not at formal political declarations but at social practice, Transnistria has Europeanized faster in some respects than parts of Moldova itself.

Why did this happen? For economic reasons. Transnistria faced a shortage of jobs, and as early as 2010–2012 people began looking for work in Chișinău or in EU countries. For many, it became advantageous to work in Chișinău while living in Transnistria, where real estate and services are cheaper. Part of the business sector is also oriented toward Romania and the European Union.

We conducted research in Transnistria itself. The picture there is much more complex than it is often presented in the media. About 60 percent of respondents support friendly relations with Moldova and further development together with the Republic of Moldova. In some cases, the share of supporters of European integration there is higher than in Gagauzia or in northern Moldova.

This is a paradoxical situation: there may be more pro-European people in Tiraspol than in some cities on the territory controlled by Chișinău. The reason is simple: when people do not receive the expected benefits from local authorities and see economic stagnation, they begin to look for alternatives.

The most likely scenario, in my opinion, is not escalation, but Transnistria trying to resolve its issues with Chișinău through the European Union or European politicians. Negotiations between Chișinău and Tiraspol, despite all public rhetoric, continue constantly — on energy, schools, language issues, finance, sanctions, the transition to the leu and other matters.

Yes, there is a “carrot and stick” logic, there is tension, bargaining and sanctions mechanisms. But I do not currently see a high probability of major escalation.

The Russian military contingent in Transnistria also has its limitations. As far as is known, the last rotation took place back in 2014. The human factor in conflicts is extremely important. A person is ready to fight when he feels a real threat to himself, his family and his home. But fighting in someone else’s war, when Transnistria itself is relatively calm, requires an entirely different motivation.

I do not think that either Transnistrian society or local elites are interested in escalation. They have economic ties with European companies, including through business structures that have an interest in stability.

Of course, in politics and war one can never speak of zero probability. In 2022, we saw that even scenarios many experts considered unlikely can materialize. But under current conditions, modelling does not show a high probability of escalation in Transnistria.

Moreover, one must understand that the Ukrainian army today is one of the strongest armies in Europe in terms of real combat experience. Any scenario involving Transnistria militarily against Ukraine would be extremely risky and illogical.

Vitaliy Barvinenko:

Thank you for this conversation. Today our guest was Ian Lisnevskyi, a political analyst from Moldova. It is always interesting to speak with him because he articulates ideas that many people may hesitate to express publicly.

Ian Lisnevski:

Thank you. It was a pleasure to join the discussion.